

6 SEP 1978

DD/A Registry
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : F. W. M. Janney
Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : NFAC Supergrade Ceiling

REFERENCE : Memo for DDCI fr D/NFAC dtd 8 Aug 78,
same subject

1. This memorandum contains my comments regarding reference, as you requested. It should be noted that the supergrade ceiling allotted to NFAC is not necessarily a sum of the number of supergrade positions in that component. Supergrade positions are established or disapproved on their own merits. Supergrade ceiling is allotted by assigning a pro rata share of the Agency supergrade ceiling to each Directorate in order to establish the number of promotions available at each level.

2. The comments which follow must be prefaced by the fact that some of the positions referred to in reference are as yet unevaluated. The positions in the Requirements and Evaluations Staff, for example, were addressed in the survey of the Office of the Comptroller when the staff belonged to that Office. The survey indicated that three of the five supergrade positions in that staff should be downgraded to GS-15. While it is possible that the reorganization impacted on those positions, definite determinations can only be made after the positions are analyzed as they now exist.

NFAC Review Panel

Reference proposed three supergrade positions be attached to the Office of the Director, NFAC to provide him with an independent review of major intelligence production. PMCD will evaluate these positions as soon as position descriptions are made available to them and my recommendations will be forwarded as soon as those evaluations are complete. Consideration must also be given to the impact of these positions on existing NFAC review panels and senior positions, as well as whether the positions might be more appropriately implemented in some other employment category such as Contract Employee, Independent Contractor, etc.

Senior Intelligence Specialists

The concept of establishing supergrade positions for "Senior Intelligence Specialists" is the subject of a separate memorandum (attached). As stated in that memorandum, I have serious reservations as to the legality and propriety of implementation of the concept as proposed by NFAC MAG. Viewing that same proposal in the context of reference generates further reservations on my part. The functions of the "Intelligence Specialist Corps" must be weighed against those of the National Intelligence Office and the NFAC Senior Review Panel, with full consideration given to the possibility of duplication of effort at senior levels.

ORPA Division Chiefs

These positions have also been addressed in a separate memorandum and will be implemented by 1 October 1978.

3. In summary, my recommendation is that the Director, NFAC submit position descriptions for evaluation at his earliest opportunity. Should we find justification for additional supergrade positions, we will so recommend to you. I would suggest that you defer any additional allocation of supergrade ceiling to NFAC pending an Office of Personnel review of their additional supergrade requirements.

(Signed) F. W. M. Jamney

F. W. M. Jamney

Att

Dist:

- 0 - Add
- 1 - ER
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OP/PMCD/ [REDACTED] jdc (29 Aug 78)
Retyped: OD/Pers:jmk (5 Sep 78)

STATINTL

4 AUG 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : F. W. M. Janney
Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : NFAC Management Advisory Group Proposal to Establish
an Intelligence Specialist Corps within NFAC

REFERENCE : Memo for DCI fr NFAC MAG dtd 6 Jun 78, subject:
Creation of an Intelligence Specialist Corps
within NFAC

1. I have had an opportunity to review the proposal contained in the reference memorandum and offer the following comments for your consideration.

The concept of high-graded analysts with no supervisory responsibilities was established in the 1960's. The NFAC MAG is proposing to enlarge the concept in numbers and more formally institutionalize it by creating an "Intelligence Specialist Corps."

We have no problem with the concept of senior analysts. To increase the numbers, however, MAG would convert supervisory slots, for example, GS-15 Branch Chiefs to GS-14, and allocate senior analyst slots within NFAC by the size of the Office.

The Agency is not exempt from the principle of "equal pay for substantially equal work," Title V, U.S.C., Sec. 5301, Pay Comparability Systems Principle, nor the Job Evaluation Policy Act of 1970 which provides a common approach for the evaluation of positions. Each position is classified on the basis of some nine common factors, ranging from knowledge required to span of authority and, where pertinent, supervisory responsibility is added. The complexity of each factor can be converted to a point scale which in the aggregate determines the grade. To assign a lower grade to a Branch Chief classified at GS-15 without diminishing the importance in one or more factors would quite simply violate the principle of "equal pay for equal work."

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STATINTL

The same is true at the supergrade level only more so because of the finite ceiling imposed. The ceiling on Agency supergrades is [REDACTED] positions classified at that level. An increase in the on-duty number of supergrade analysts means a decrease in the number who are currently paid at that level as a result of determining the aggregate responsibility-point-count of the position. The principles involved preclude simply converting established supergrade positions whether non-supervisory staff in an office or the NFAC Front Office or Deputy Division or Division Chief. The classification of each position is determined by the content of the position. While we can look at a newly designated position and determine that it is in fact at the GS-16 level, we can today only pay [REDACTED] employees at the supergrade rate.

STATINTL

The organizational structure of NFAC is established with a number of managerial positions and staff positions at supergrade levels. Our way to extract supergrade ceiling for analytical positions would be to telescope the current structure by melding existing Divisions and/or Offices.

2. It is of particular relevance to keep in mind current House Appropriations Committee inquiries and review of our supergrade requirements and the importance of our ability to justify these requirements to the HAC and OMB based on accepted position classification methodology that promotes "equal pay for substantially equal work." In the past our position classification system has stood the test of external review and, in effect, has provided the basis for defending our grade structure when it has been questioned. I am concerned that the NFAC MAG method of allocating supergrade positions based on organizational strength would cause internal position grade inequities as well as increased concern for various external review organizations. I believe our classification system can continue to accommodate senior grade levels for non-supervisory analysts where the position requirement can justify the higher grade.

3. In conclusion, it is essential to protect the Director and the Agency with a viable and consistent job classification methodology for all Agency supergrade positions in order to minimize external criticism and to provide a sound basis for external justification of new supergrade requirements.

(Signed) F. W. M. Janney

F. W. M. Janney

Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600100003-5

NFAC # 3361-78

8 AUG 1978

78-2522

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Robert R. Bowie
Director, National Foreign Assessment Center

SUBJECT : Supergrade Ceiling

REFERENCE : Memo from DD/NFAC to DCI dated 9 June 1978,
Subject: NFAC Review Panel--Supergrade
Ceiling

1. Action Requested: This memorandum requests that additional supergrade authorization be made available to NFAC.

2. Background: The former DDI had a supergrade ceiling of [REDACTED]. With the establishment of NFAC, 21 supergrade positions were transferred from the O/DCI for the NIOs. Subsequently, 5 supergrade positions were transferred to NFAC with the Requirements and Evaluation Staff. (One supergrade position was converted to SPS at our request.) Thus, NFAC should now have an authorization of [REDACTED] supergrade positions. This represents only [REDACTED] percent of the Agency's supergrade ceiling, and is allocated as follows:

Positions Percentage

NFAC Management
Office Heads and Deputies
NIOs
Assistant NIOs
Division-level Supergrades
SALT Support
Senior Rep-London
Congressional Support
Collection Liaison

TOTAL



We have reviewed the above distribution and find no satisfactory way of satisfying the new requirements discussed in the following paragraphs.

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NFAC Review Panel. The establishment of a senior review panel represents an important step toward enriching the intelligence production process by drawing upon the skills, knowledge and insights of highly respected authorities residing outside of the Intelligence Community. The panel will consist of a small group of generalists serving full-time; they will be attached immediately to the Office of the Director, NFAC, to provide him with an independent review of major intelligence production. We will only be able to acquire the requisite level of experience and expertise at the supergrade level. Referenced memorandum to the DCI discussed this problem who acknowledged his commitment to provide an additional three or four supergrade billets for this panel.

Senior Intelligence Specialists. One of the most vexing of NFAC's personnel problems over the years has been its inability to reward its most talented analysts with senior positions without burdening them with supervisory responsibilities. As far back as 1971, for example, the President made clear his concern that an improved intelligence product was imperative. He stressed the need for "more rewarding careers for intelligence analysts, including the opportunity to reach higher salary levels while remaining analysts...." This view was recently endorsed by the Senate Select Committee, which recommended that the then DDI provide a more flexible, less hierarchical personnel system as a means of rewarding analytical excellence. Finally, a recent study by the NFAC Management Advisory Group recommended the establishment of an "Intelligence Specialist Corps" to accomplish this. This report has been approved in principle by the DCI who has instructed the DDCI and D/NFAC to provide recommendations for implementation.

As things now stand, for supergrade analysts to move into supergrade ranks, by and large they must become resource managers. However, this may not be their strong suit; in effect, we are sometimes required to give up a good analyst for a poor manager in order to reward the analyst. It is our strong belief that if NFAC is going to be successful over the long run in improving the quality of intelligence analysis, we must find effective means for rewarding our top analysts so that their substantive experience and expertise can be retained where it is most needed--in the analytical ranks.

We are not proposing great numbers of supergrade analysts and would hope to be able over time to provide some ceiling ourselves. But to get this program off to a reasonably good start, we need to provide at least one such analyst for each of four major analytical offices (OER, OSR, ORPA, OGCR).

ORPA Division Chiefs. The Office of Regional and Political Analysis (ORPA) has a total of 8 positions approved at the supergrade level. In order for all ORPA division chiefs, plus the Chief, Strategic Warning Staff, to have supergrade positions we will require an authorization for six additional supergrade positions.

3. Recommendations: It is recommended that the NFAC supergrade authorization be increased by 13--from the current level of [REDACTED]. The additional authorization would be allocated as follows: NFAC Review Panel (+3); Senior Intelligence Specialists (+4); and ORPA Division Chiefs and Chief, Strategic Warning Staff (+6).

[REDACTED]
Robert R. Bowie

cc: Director of Personnel

APPROVED: _____

Date

DISAPPROVED: _____

Date

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NFAC/ [REDACTED] (7 Aug 78)

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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 400, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 25, 1978

Executive Registry

78-9967

DD/A Registry

78-1790/3

IN REPLY PLEASE
REFER TO Q-4544

COPY 1

Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Director:

I forward for your review a Report on the Frank Snepp/Vietnam Case which the Committee's staff has prepared in response to former Chairman Inouye's directive to investigate this case.

This Report has been prepared with care: the Committee has taken sworn statements from Messrs. Frank Snepp and Thomas Polgar; staff has examined a large body of documentary material, including CIA's own Working Group Report (of April 1978) on the Snepp matter and the various court documents generated by U.S. v. Snepp; and staff has interviewed more than 40 Vietnam-related officials, senior and junior, representing various vantage points and attitudes.

Above all, staff has pursued this investigation dispassionately, seeking to hear all sides and to be fair to all participants. There is no question that Mr. Snepp was deceitful and violated his Secrecy Agreements. The Report's focus, however, is on the substance of his allegations, apart from his unfortunate conduct. As the Report judges, a few of Mr. Snepp's allegations have no validity; a few others are valid; most of his allegations -- and these concern the most important questions -- are each a mixture of valid-invalid.

The principal Findings developed by the staff's investigation relate to matters broader than the Snepp case itself. These Findings ask (1) whether present CIA procedures for dealing with grievances, dissent, and publishing are adequate; (2) whether CIA may be employing double standards concerning the release or clearance of materials by CIA or ex-CIA officers; and (3) whether CIA

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Admiral Stansfield Turner
August 25, 1978
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
places adequate stress on the necessity for its Stations to report local situations fully and objectively. The Report also includes Recommendations.

I should add that the Report represents the agreed views of the staff task group which prepared this study. They have conducted their inquiry responsibly, and such questions as they raise about the performance and practices of CIA are not a look back in anger, but are offered in the interests of drawing lessons which can help CIA to enhance its performance and avoid future cases of irresponsible action on the part of serving or former officers.

On behalf of the Committee I wish to thank you and your officers for the assistance you have given our inquiry into this case. I will be interested in receiving your comments on this Report in the very near future, so that the Committee can then forward a revised, final version to the White House. At such time, the Committee will also wish to consider whether to publish a suitably sanitized version for the public, checked in advance with you and so worded as scrupulously to avoid interfering in continuing court processes.

I will enjoy hearing from you on these questions in the near future. Thank you for assisting the work of the Committee.

Sincerely,



Birch Bayh
Chairman

Enclosure

Hope all is well, Stan!
Birch

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